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Article 8

Capital Punishment and Crimes of Murder
Dorean M. Koenig*
"This was a worthless fellow: but Nihil Humanun, Alienum."'
Definitional distinctions in the substantive law of murder confront judges and juries every day. Unfortunately, these distinctions
have little impact on the social control the criminal law seeks to
accomplish. The two main branches of the substantive law of first
degree murder, premeditated murder2 and felony murder,3 have
developed so peculiarly that their current disparate standards of
proof prompt questions concerning basic notions of fairness.4
Under the crime of premeditated murder, the state of mind with
which the act is done is regarded as the defining characteristic
upon which the degree of culpability is based. The physical act of
killing is accorded secondary significance.5 Conversely, under felony murder, the actual act of killing during the commission of a
felony is paramount, while the required mental state of the defendant in directly or indirectly causing the death may be satisfied
with only a showing of an intent to commit some lesser crime.6 Yet,
Professor of Law, The Thomas M. Cooley Law School
1. "Nothing human is foreign," 2 C.F. ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 239 (1850)
(quoting John Adams, June 28, 1770). Upon being acquitted of a charge of rape at
Worchester, the defendant stated: "God bless Mr. Adams; God bless his soul. I am not to be
hanged and I don't care what else they do to me." Id.
2. See infra notes 35-56 and accompanying text.
3. See in/ra notes 57-86 and accompanying text.
4. Now inequality is in general the creature of positive law ....
[I]nequalities resulting
from the law must make sense ....
The arbitrary though indispensable to many of law's
daily operations, is always suspect; it becomes unjust when it discriminates between indistinguishables. As human integers, men are indistinguishables. This natural fact imposes a
limit on the classifatory discretion of positive law. The sense of justice does not tolerate
juridic classes by which the integral status of man is violated.
E. CAHN, THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE 14-15 (1949).
5. "Homicide, or the mere killing of one person by another, does not, of itself, constitute
murder; . . . It is not, therefore, the act which constitutes the offense, or determines its
character; but the quo animo, the disposition, or state of mind with which it is done."
Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212, 217 (1862).
6. "If it happens during a robbery, it is murder in the first degree, and you therefore
determine basically if a robbery was being committed, because if you decide it was, that
carries you the whole distance." Morris, The Felon's Responsibility for the Lethal Acts of
Others, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 50, 55 (1956) (quoting the directions of Judge Curtis Bok to the
*
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both types of murder can result in the imposition of the death
penalty.
The requirements for both premeditated and felony murder convictions are based upon archaic religious beliefs that have been, at
once, exaggerated by notions of consciousness and neutralized by
presumptions and other devices. As a result, one line of cases involving capital punishment for premeditated murder zealously protects and furthers subjectivist notions of consciousness and intentionality in jury instructions." In contrast, a second line of cases
involving felony murder uses presumptive devices that do not discriminate between underlying offenses which should carry vastly
different penalties.8
This article will first examine the historical development of the
crime of murder in English history. Next, the American development of degrees of murder as a method of limiting capital punishment and the development of a separate category of intentional
murder will be discussed, including due process safeguards developed by the United States Supreme Court on presumptions of intent and burden of proof in wilful murder cases.
Lastly, this article will trace the separate development in the
United States of the felony murder doctrine, including the absence
of due process safeguards on presumptive devices. Recent United
States Supreme Court cases addressing the problems of proportionality and fairness in felony murder cases, in light of the absence of such safeguards, will be discussed.
MURDER-A SEARCH FOR A DEFINITION

"Once we recognize that a definition is, strictly speaking, neither
true nor false but rather a resolution to use language in a certain
way, we are able to pass the only judgment that ever needs to be
passed on a definition, a judgment of utility or inutility."'9
From the earliest documentation of English law, homicides were

jury in Commonwealth v. Wilson) [hereinafter cited as Morris].
In People v. Stamp, 2 Cal. App. 3d 203, 82 Cal. Rptr. 598 (1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 19
(1970), the court stated "a killing committed in either the perpetration of or an attempt to
perpetrate robbery is murder of the first degree. This is true whether the killing is . . .
merely accidental or unintentional, and whether or not the killing is planned as a part of the
commission of the robbery." 2 Cal. App. 3d at 209, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 602.
7. See infra notes 42-56 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 77-86 and accompanying text.
9. Cohen, Field Theory and Judicial Logic, 59 YALE L.J. 238, 271 (1950).
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punishable by death.1 0 But generally all crimes, including homicide, on a first conviction could be atoned for by the payment of
money." If the money were not paid, it was left to the family of
the dead man to pursue the original course of slaying the slayer.1"
One of the earliest forms of punishment by payment of money
was established by King Aethelbert in the Dooms, around 600 A.D.
A tariff of a sum certain for acts of violence was imposed under
this system.' 8 The purpose of the payment was to attempt to prevent a private blood feud by compelling the family of the victim to
accept money payments as compensation for its loss. With some
modification, the tariff system continued into the twelfth century. 14 Throughout this period, there were no distinctions between
civil and criminal law or between kinds of homicide.'"
Following the Norman conquest, differentiation in the crime of
homicide began. The most serious type of homicide in England became the secret killing of a Norman. The term "murder" was used
to describe only this secret killing.' 6 Glanville wrote at the end of
the twelfth century that the "hundred" (township) was liable to a
heavy fine called "Murdrum.'1 7 A presumption existed that a person found dead was a Norman who had been secretly killed.' 8 The
presumption was rebutted only upon proof by the defendant that
the person slain was born in England. Such proof relieved the
"hundred" from having to pay the fine.' 9
In addition to the fine imposed for "murder," other monetary

10. The Laws of Alfred state "Let the man who slayeth another wilfully perish by
death." 3 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF CRIMINAL LAW IN ENGLAND 24 (1883) [hereinafter cited
as STEPHEN].
11. "The damages to be paid to the family of the deceased, and the satisfaction to be
made to the person whose peace had been broken by the homicide, are much more prominent, and seem to have been regarded as much more important, than what we should call
the criminal consequences of the offence." Id. at 23.
12. F. MAITLAND & F. MONTAGUE, A SKTCH OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 19-20 (1915)
[hereinafter cited as MAITLAND & MONTAGUE].
13. Id. at 6. "If one man strike another with the fist on the nose-three shillings."
14. Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARv. L. REv. 974, 980 (1931-32) [hereinafter cited as Sayre];
STEPHEN, supra note 10, at 25.
15. MAITLAND & MONTAGUE, supra note 12, at 15.
16. The term "murder" derives from "morth-works" meaning "deeds of darkness."
"Morth" means "secret." See MAITLAND & MONTAGUE, supra note 12, at 27-28; STEPHEN,
supra note 10, at 25.
17. "Murdrum" is the Latin form of "morth." The offense thus evolved from a private
wrong to an offense against the state to be paid for by the community. STEPHEN, supra note
10, at 26, 35.
18. STEPHEN, supra note 10, at 31.
19. Id.
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penalties were attached to homicide. For example, fines called
"wite," "bot," and "wer" were to be paid, respectively, in part to
the King, to the lord of the township, and to the victim's family.
The "wer" varied according to the social status of the victim. 2 0 The

progressive complexity and severity of the penalty system, however, eventually toppled the entire scheme."
During the twelfth century, the moral blameworthiness of the
wrongdoer charged with homicide was rarely taken into account
during the determination of the wrongdoer's guilt or innocence.
Only in the punishment phase did blameworthiness play a role."
But in the thirteenth century, the growing power of the church
strongly influenced the law of murder, a term that by then had
outgrown its early restriction to the unnatural death of a Norman.23 The Canonists divided the human personality into the two
entities of body and soul and created in the criminal law a division
between act and moral guilt.' 4 The moral guilt that made an act
criminal in the thirteenth century was general mens rea, or general
moral blameworthiness. During the ensuing years, concepts of
mens rea in the context of lesser crimes than murder developed
and were tailored into particularized kinds of intent, such as intent
to steal in the crime of larceny and intent to commit a felony
therein for the crime of burglary.' 5 But the crime of murder had
not yet been broken down into definitional categories and the law
did not yet recognize distinctions between accidental or justifiable
homicide. The criminal law, then, was slower to respond to definitional distinctions in the crime of murder based on particularization of kinds of intent. But as will be seen, this early general focus
on moral blameworthiness provided fertile ground for development
of the felony murder doctrine where a person's involvement in a
wrongful act is sufficient to make that person liable for any resulting death.'

20. Id. at 23-24; MArrLAND & MONTAGUE, supra note 12, at 19-20. See also the Laws of
King Aethelbert, id. at app. I.
21. MArrAND & MONTAGUE, supra note 12, at 20-21.
22. Sayre, supra note 14, at 981-82.
23. Id. at 983-84.
24. Id. at 983-87. "Crime, as a compound concept, generally constituted only from concurrence of an evil meaning mind with an evil doing hand . . . " Morissette v. United
States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952).
25. Sayre, supra note 14, at 999-1002.
26. "[T]he mens rea or 'malice' necessary for the felony is in every instance different
from the mens rea or 'malice aforethought' required for murder; but for certain killings the
law will allow the latter to be conclusively proved from the former." Morris, supra note 6, at
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The pardon of the King and the infamous benefit of clergy
evolved during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Rather than
inquire into the defendant's mental state, the court forgave the defendant for the commission of murder merely if he could read a
line in a book or repeat a verse of the Psalms from memory.2 7 In
addition, the right of sanctuary allowed a murderer to seek refuge
in a church, confess his crime, and leave the realm.2 8 Excessive
pardons for heinous crimes, however, brought reform. By the early
sixteenth century, the King's pardon and benefit of clergy were unavailable for crimes of malice prepensed. This exclusion was accomplished by a series of statutes using that term.2 9 Originally, the
term was construed in a popular religious sense as a kind of wickedness of heart.30 In these crimes, the underlying motive, not immediate intent, was critical. Sudden killings such as those occurring in a tavern fight, did not constitute malice prepensed. This
construction of the term changed, however. Malice aforethought,
the anglicized form of malice prepensed, became shortened over
time to "malice" and became a term of art "signifying neither
'malice' nor 'aforethought' in the popular sense." 3'
3
Under the sixteenth century statutes, malice was presumed; 2
once a death was shown to have been caused by the defendant, it
was the defendant's burden to establish the circumstances of justification, excuse, or mitigation to prove the crime was not of malice
prepensed, that is, motivated by a wicked heart. The inability of
the defendant charged with a malice prepensed crime to invoke
such pardons as the benefit of clergy, even though evidence of actual malice had not been introduced, was justified by Lambard,
Coke, and Hale on grounds that malice was "implied" in the law in
three situations: 1) where the killing was voluntarily committed
without provocation; 2) where the victim was an officer or minister
of justice; and 3) where the defendant killed his victim while intending to commit a theft or burglary.3 3 These situations of im-

60.
27. MArTLAND & MONTAGUE, supra note 12, at 71-73.
28. Id. at 69-71.
29. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 692-93 (1975).
30. Sayre, supra note 14, at 997.
31. Wechsler & Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide, 37 COLUM. L. Rsv. 701,
707 (1937) [hereinafter cited as Wechsler & Michael].
32. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 693 (1975).
33. M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 455 n.1 (1847). Note that the first situation now has
been changed by Mullaney v. Wilbur so that the ultimate burden of proof is on the prosecution. The second situation generally has fallen into disuse in the United States. The strong-
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plied malice were later translated into the modern concepts of ac4
tual or implied intent to kill.8
The shifting meanings attached, historically, to the term malice
reflect the split between those people who currently demand proof
of conscious wrongdoing for a murder conviction and those who
would base their determination on a variety of objective criteria.
PREMEDITATED MURDER

Notions of specific intent such as those which developed after
the thirteenth century for non-homicidal crimes were not applied
to the crime of murder until the introduction of degrees of murder
in the United States.
Wilful murder and wanton act murder were not differentiated in
England. In the eighteenth century, John Adams, as defense attorney for the British soldiers charged with the Boston Massacre,
opened his case with a quote from Beccaria's then recently pub3 "If, by supporting
lished An Essay on Crimes and Punishments:"
the rights of mankind, and of invincible truth, I shall contribute to
save from the agonies of death one unfortunate victim of tyranny,
or of ignorance equally fatal, his blessing in tears of transport will
be sufficient consolation to me for the contempt of all mankind."3
Beccaria, who was greatly influenced by Montesquieu, advanced
the proposition that punishment be made more proportionate to
the crime. The effect of this proposition on the new colonies was
obvious.3 7 Justice William Bradford of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court prepared a memorandum to the Governor of Pennsylvania
which proposed, for the first time, that the crime of murder be
divided into two degrees, only one of which would be punishable
by death. Bradford found that only "deliberate assasination"
should be capitally punished.3 8 The substance of the memorandum
later became the bill in Pennsylvania that provided: "Resolved,
that all murder perpetrated by poison or by lying in wait, or by
est most frequent use of implied malice is in felony-murder. See W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr,
HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 561-62 (1972).
34. Cf. People v. Morrin, 31 Mich. App. 301, 187 N.W.2d 434 (1971).
35. Beccaria, An Essay on Crimes and Punishments (1953 reprint of 2d Am. ed. 1859).

36.

2 C.F.

ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS

238 (1850) (quoting John Adams, June 28,

1770).
37. Keedy, History of the Pennsylvania Statute Creating Degrees of Murder, 97 U. PA.
L. REV. 759 (1949). Cf. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 335-36 (1972) (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
38. Bradford, An Enquiry How Far the Punishment of Death is Necessary in Pennsylvania, 12 Am. J. LEGAL HIST. 122, 148 (1968) (originally published in 1793).
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any kind of wilful premeditated killing . . . shall be deemed murder of the first degree." On the second reading, the bill was
amended on motion from the floor to add felony murder provisions: "or which shall be committed in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, or burglary." 9 The
amended bill was passed by the Pennsylvania Assembly in 1794
and became law.4" Subsequently, many states adopted
this scheme,
41
and even those that did not were influenced by it.
As a result of the Pennsylvania statute, the crimes to which
capital punishment applied were narrowed substantially. Two
problems emerged, however: 1) how to define the higher degree of
wilful murder, and 2) whether to continue the recognition of the
common law presumptions regarding implied malice in wilful murder cases. The attempt to define wilful murder spawned a hopeless
4
profusion of language pertaining to mental state and culpability.
In some states, the mens rea or guilty mind notions of specific intent found in common law larceny and burglary gradually became
engrafted onto the capital crime of wilful murder.4" Justice Benja-

39. The provisions of this statute as originally adopted in 1794 are currently contained
in 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2502 (Purdon 1973).
40. The statute now includes murders which occur in the attempt, commission, or flight
from commission, of "robbery, rape, or deviate sexual intercourse by force or threat of force,
arson, burglary, or kidnapping." 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 2502(a) (Purdon 1973).
41. See, e.g., the Oklahoma murder statute, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.7 (West
1981), which reads:
A. A person commits murder in the first degree when he unlawfully and with
malice aforethought causes the death of another human being. Malice is that deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a human being, which is
manifested by external circumstances capable of proof.
B. A person also commits the crime of murder in the first degree when he takes
the life of a human being, regardless of malice, in the commission of forcible rape,
robbery with a dangerous weapon, kidnapping, escape from lawful custody, first
degree burglary or first degree arson.
Six states do not divide murder into degrees: Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi
and South Carolina.
42. Purver, The Language of Murder, U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1306, 1309-10 (1967). Cf. People
v. Morrin, 31 Mich. App. 301, 187 N.W.2d 434 (1971); Wechsler & Michael, supra note 31.
43. Cf. Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463 (1946); People v. Bender, 163 P.2d 8 (Cal.
1945); People v. Hoffmeister, 394 Mich. 155, 229.N.W.2d 305, reh'g denied, 394 Mich. 944,
230 N.W.2d 270 (1975).
The necessary corollary to the court's particularization of a specific intent in wilful murder for first degree was the recognition of a lesser kind of "wanton act" murder, or second
degree murder. People v. Morrin, 31 Mich. App. 301, 187 N.W.2d 434 (1971). Second degree
murder is not capitally punished. The two degrees of murder are also differentiated by the
amount of time needed to make the decision to kill and, in some states, the degree of calmness required for first degree murder. Cf. Joint Comm'n on Continuing Legal Educ. of the
ALI & ABA, The Problem of Premeditation,in THE PROBLEM OF PUNISHING HOMICIDE 7-16
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min Cardozo said of this new effort of particularizing the mens rea
of wilful murder:
I think the students of the mind should make it clear to the
lawmakers that the statute is framed along the lines of a defective
and unreal psychology. If intent is deliberate and premeditated
whenever there is choice, then in truth it is always deliberate and
premeditated, since choice is involved in the hypothesis of the
44
intent.
The more important development, however, occurred with the
abolishment of the presumptions in cases decided first by state
courts and later by the United States Supreme Court. 5 In 1951,
the Supreme Court found an intent requirement in a federal statute based upon a common law crime." The Court noted that
"wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal," 47 and that crime
came only from "concurrence of an evil-meaning mind with an
8
evil-doing hand.""1
Almost twenty years later another link in the
movement away from presumptions in wilful murder cases was
forged in In Re Winship.49 Winship established that the standard
of proof in juvenile cases is guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The
Court observed: "It is critical that the moral force of the criminal
law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in
50
doubt whether innocent men are being condemned.
With this background, the Court reviewed the Maine statute for
wilful homicide in Mullaney v. Wilbur.5 1 The Maine statute had
been earlier interpreted to mean that once the prosecution established a homicide as being both intentional and unlawful, malice
was conclusively presumed unless the defendant proved by a fair
preponderance of the evidence that he acted in the heat of passion
on sudden provocation. In rejecting the placing of this burden on
the defendant, the Court, relying on Winship, found that the due
(1962).
For an example of where no degrees of murder exist, see Banks v. State, 85 Tex. Crim.
165, 211 S.W. 217 (1919).
44.

B. CARDOZO, LAW AND LITERATURE 100 (1931).

45. It was only natural that the intent requirements found so essential in crimes less
than murder would form the basis upon which to overturn the presumptive devices relating
to wilful murder found at the common law.
46. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
47. Id. at 252.
48. Id. at 251.
49. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
50. Id. at 364.
51. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
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process clause "requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation when the issue is properly presented in a homicide case." 5"
The Court acknowledged that the holding in Mullaney created
for the prosecution the difficult task of proving a negative: that the
crime was not reduced to manslaughter.5 3 The Mullaney articulation of the prosecutor's burden of proof was reinforced by the Supreme Court in Sandstrom v. Montana," which struck down a jury
instruction stating: "The law presumes that a person intends the
ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts."5 5 In Sandstrom, the
defendant had admitted killing the victim but had alleged that he
did so as a result of a personality disorder which kept him from
having the knowledge and purpose required for murder. The Court
found that the jury instruction conflicted with the presumption of
innocence and invaded the factfinding function in violation of the
due process clause.16
As a result of these cases, the due process clauses of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution have effectively eliminated the concept of "implied malice" in wilful murder cases. Now, presumptive devices in these cases can no longer
be used to bridge evidentiary problems of proof of intent, nor can
the burden of proof of mitigation be placed upon the defendant.
FELONY MURDER

While premeditated murder is characterized by its underlying
mental state, felony murder is marked by an extraordinary attenuation between act and intent. The felony murder doctrine, in its
broadest sense, provides that a defendant commits felony murder
whenever a death is caused by his commission of or attempt to
commit specific crimes or any felony. Some states have limited by
various methods the extent of the felony-murder doctrine, 7 while
52. Id. at 704.
53. Id. at 701. But the Court found the requirement to impose "no unique hardship on
the prosecution." Id. at 702.

54.
55.

442 U.S. 510 (1979).
Id. at 513.

56. Id. at 524.
57. Some states have limited the felony murder rule in the English tradition by requiring that the felony be committed in a manner inherently dangerous to human life. Cf. People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 299 N.W.2d 304 (1980). Some states have limited the harsh
application of the doctrine to situations where the killing is performed by the felon, his
accomplices, or an associate. Weick v. State, 420 A.2d 159 (Del. 1980). Florida requires the
personal presence of the aider and abettor. Hite v. State, 364 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1978), cert.
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others have allowed it to expand in an amorphous manner. 58 Moreover, under some state felony murder statutes, the death penalty
may be imposed.5 9
Historical Perspective
The earliest descriptions of felony murder indicate that the doctrine was applied originally to a narrow range of crime. Bracton,
writing about 200 years after the Norman Conquest, was one of the
first to note that a "causal homicide" during an unlawful act was
unlawful, but he did not label it as murder.6 0 It was Lambard, in
1610, who stated:
And therefore if a thief do kill a man whom he never saw before
and whom he intended to rob only, it is murder in the judgment
of law, which implyeth a former malicious dispostion in him
rather to kill the man than not to have his money from him.61
In this hypothetical, Lambard may have been referring to a sudden intentionalkilling in the course of a robbery. The felony murder doctrine was broadened in 1628 by Coke in a manner that the
early nineteenth century jurist Stephen found astonishing.6 2 Coke

denied, 372 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 1979). But for a strict application of the doctrine, see Enmund
v. State, 399 So. 2d 1362 (Fla. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 473 (1981). See also Westerfield, The Mens Rea Requirement of Accomplice Liability in Criminal Law-Knowledge or
Intent, 51 Miss. L.J. 155, 161-69 (1980) (limitation on causation) [hereinafter cited as Westerfield]. The New York Court of Appeals allowed the defense of intoxication, calling felonymurder "the legal fiction of transferred intent." People v. Wood, 8 N.Y.2d 48, 51, 167
N.E.2d 736, 738, 201 N.Y.S.2d 328, 331 (1960). For a discussion of second degree murder,
see People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 783, 402 P.2d 130, 134, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 446
(1965). See also Annot., 50 A.L.R.3d 397, 404 (1973).
58. People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 299 N.W.2d 304 (1980); Jenkins v. State, 230 A.2d
262 (Del. 1967), aff'd, 395 U.S. 213 (1969). See generally infra notes 73-75, 114-16 and accompanying text.
59. See infra notes 114-16 and accompanying text. See also Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S.
454 (1981) (co-defendant shot and killed a storekeeper); Lockett v. Ohio, 428 U.S. 586
(1978); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (defendant, who was drunk, was
struck in the face and threatened, went along with three others in a robbery, but remained
in the car as a look-out); People v. Earl, 29 Cal. 3d 894, 105 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1973) (killed
while shoplifting); Commonwealth v. Bolish, 391 Pa. 550, 138 A.2d 447 (1958), reh'g denied,
357 U.S. 931 (1958) (co-felon accidentally killed himself while perpetrating an arson).
60. 3 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 32-33 (1883). Bracton
classifies under the same heading homicide by a sword, homicide by a blow with a fist,
homicide by a person provoked in the highest degree, and homicide by a robber. This concept predates the emergence of the distinction between murder and manslaughter. See 2
POLLACK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 484 (2d ed. 1898).
61. STEPHEN, supra note 10, at 50-51.
62. Id. at 57.
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asserted that if a homicide occurred," and "[i]f the act be unlawful
it is murder."'04 In support of his statement, Coke offered the fol-

lowing example:
As if A., meaning to steal a deer in the park of B., shooteth at the
deer and by the glance of the arrow killeth a boy that is hidden in
a bush, this is murder, for the act (of stealing the deer) was unlawful, although A. had no intent to hurt the boy and knew not of
him."
This unfortunate statement by Coke has been discredited by later
historians as being based on a misinterpretation of either Bracton
or earlier cases."
Following many years of limiting the rule, England eventually
abolished its felony murder rule in 1957.7 In contrast, the felony
murder doctrine in the United States has persisted. But even in
the United States the doctrine has been criticized periodically
throughout its existence.6 8
63. A homicide is the killing of a human being by a human being. "In order that a man
may be killed by an act the connection between the act and the death must be direct and
distinct, and though not necessarily immediate it must not be too remote." Id. at 2-3.
64. Id. at 57.
65. Id.
66. 2 D. KOENIG, Homicide (ch. 16)-Commentary, in MICHIGAN CRIMINAL JURY INSrRUCTIONS 107 (1977). See also People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 689, 299 N.W.2d 304, 30910 (1980).
67. The Homicide Act, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, ch. 11, § 1 (1957), provides that "[w]here a person
kills another in the course or furtherance of some other offence, the killing shall not amount
to murder unless done with the same malice aforethought (express or implied) as is required
for a killing to amount to murder when not done in the furtherance of another offence."
68. In the nineteenth century, Oliver Wendell Holmes objected to the harshness of the
felony murder rule and analogized its seeming illogic to the accidental shooting of a man
while stealing a chicken, a variation of the scenario established by Coke:
The only blameworthy act is firing at the chickens, knowing them to belong to
another. It isneither more nor less so because an accident happens afterwards;
and hitting a man, whose presence could not have been suspected, is an accident.
The fact that the shooting is felonious does not make it any more likely to kill
people. If the object of the rule is to prevent such accidents, it should make accidental killing with firearms murder, not accidental killing in the effort to steal;
while, if its object is to prevent stealing, it would do better to hang one thief in
every thousand by lot.
O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 58 (M. DeWolfe Howe ed. 1963).
More recently, a court has criticized the rule as being "of questionable origin." People v.
Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 689, 299 N.W.2d 304, 307 (1980) (citations omitted). The court posited that "the reasons for the rule no longer exist, making it an anachronistic remnant, a
historical survivor for which there is no logical or practical basis for existence in modern
law." Id.
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Contemporary Perspective
At common law the list of felonies punishable under the felony
murder rule was limited. Under modern statutory enactments,
however, the rule has been extended so as to include any number
of statutory crimes which were not felonies at common law. In addition, common law felonies were more narrowly defined than their
modern counterparts. Burglary, for example, was the breaking and
entering of the dwelling of another in the nighttime with intent to
commit a felony. 6 ' The modern statutory felony of burglary often
does not require a breaking,7 0 includes businesses and other nondwelling units,7 1 and usually includes daytime as well as nighttime
trespasses. 2
Moreover, state legislatures have not with any uniformity placed
limitations on the felonies that can be punished as first degree felony murder.7 8 The statutory scheme of at least one state includes
the felony of extortion and the misdemeanor of petty larceny
within its felony murder rule. 7 ' Even more disconcerting than the
kind of felonies that constitute felony murder in this state is the
fact that this felony murder statute has been incorporated into a
bill making such conduct punishable by death.7 5 Under the proposed statute, then, a person whose theft of a candy bar causes a
person to have a heart attack could face the death penalty, regardless of whether the defendant is armed, or, indeed, whether he
touches or injures the victim in any way. The net effect of this
statutory proposal and other existing statutory schemes is a tre-

69. R.

PERKINS, PERS ON CRIMINAL LAW 192 (2d ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as

PERuNs].

70. W. LAFAvE & A. Scor, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAw 710 n.23 (listing 22 jurisdictions that no longer require a breaking). See People v. Earl, 29 Cal. 3d 894, 105 Cal. Rptr.
831 (1973). In Earl, a shoplifter killed a guard while resisting arrest. The court held that
this was first degree felony murder in the course of a burglary. The entry was held to be
illegal because it was done with the intent to steal. The thief was guilty of burglary when he
entered through the door. The death sentence was set aside.
71. A fence creating an enclosure was held to be a "structure" under a statute delineating all "structures" as coming within the scope of statutory breaking and entering. State v.
Roadhs, 71 Wash. 2d 705, 430 P.2d 586 (1967).
72. See, eg., MICH. CoMP. LAws AN. § 750.110 (1964).
73. Some states list "any felony." Others include mayhem, kidnapping, etc. See Moreland, A Re-examination of the Law of Homicide in 1971: The Model Penal Code, 59 Ky.
L.J. 788, 802-03 (1971).
74.

MICH. CoMp. LAws ANN.

§

750.316 (1931).

75. The Michigan Petition for Capital Punishment changes the "felony-murder" language to "felony-killing" and overturns the ruling in People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 299
N.W.2d 304 (1980). The petition includes "larceny of any kind" as capitally punishable.
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mendous broadening in the application of the common law predecessor of the modern felony murder rule.e
The strict liability of the felony murder doctrine has been extended to a form of vicarious strict liability. For example, cases
have held a defendant guilty of felony murder when his co-defendant kills himself," or is killed by a third party. 78 One felony murder case even involves a fireman who was killed while putting out
an arsonist's fire.7 ' Moreover, the felony murder doctrine has been
extended beyond its common law underpinnings through the abolishment of distinctions between principals in the first and second
degree 0 and between an accessory before or at the fact and a principal."' There is intimation in some felony murder cases that an
accessory after the fact, such as a person who hides a body, can be
guilty as the principal.1' With these modern modifications, then,
all are made responsible for collateral crimes under the felony
murder doctrine."3
76. While riding on the bus, a black man scared a 57 year-old white man, who had a bad
heart, by pleading with him for money for a fictitious eviction victim. The man was not
physically touched by the black man. Less than five minutes later, the white man died. The
black man was charged with first degree murder in the course of an extortion. See A Chance
Encounter on the Bus: Why the Law Called it Murder, Detroit Free Press, June 2, 1974, at
1-D. Cf. People v. Morales, 49 Cal. 3d 134, 122 Cal. Rptr. 157 (1975); People v. Stamp, 2 Cal.
App. 3d 203, 82 Cal. Rptr. 598 (1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 19 (1970).
77. Commonwealth v. Bolish, 391 Pa. 550, 138 A.2d 447, reh'g denied, 357 U.S. 931
(1958).
78. People v. Cabaltero, 31 Cal. 2d 52, 87 P.2d 364 (1939).
79. State v. Glover, 330 Mo. 709, 50 S.W.2d 1049 (1932).
80. "A principal in the first degree is the immediate perpetrator of the crime while a
principal in the second degree is one who did not commit the crime with his own hands but
was present and abetting the principal." PmuERs, supra note 69, at 656. For a general discussion, see Westerfield, supra note 57. See also Lanham, Accomplices, Principalsand Causation, 12 MzLs. U. L. Rzv. 490 (1980).
81. An accessory before the fact differs from a principal in the second degree only in that
the former is absent and the latter is present, either actually or constructively. See PERKINS,
supra note 69, at 658.
82. Leviness v. State, 247 S.W.2d 116 (Tex. Crim. App. 1952). "The acts of appellant in
concealing the body and driving Goleman away from the scene alone would be sufficient to
constitute him a principal to the murder, in endeavouring to secure the safety of his companion who committed such crime in his presence. See White v. State, Tex. Cr. App., 228
S.W.2d 165." Id. at 118.
83. In Thompson v. State, the defendant pleaded guilty to attempted escape by the use
of a firearm, and the state proved a robbery in the course of the escape by some of the coprincipals. "Since there is sufficient evidence showing that some of the principals had committed the robbery during the execution of the attempted jail escape, the evidence is sufficient to find the appellant, an admitted principal in the attempted escape, guilty of robbery." 514 S.W.2d 275, 276 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). State v. Moore, 580 S.W.2d 747, 752
(Mo. 1979): "Whether the fatal act was done by the defendant, an accomplice, another victim or a bystander is, under the facts here, not controlling." See State v. Baker, 607 S.W.2d

830
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With the removal of distinctions between principals in the first
and second degrees in some felony murder statutes, the prosecutor
must show only that the defendant was presently assisting with the
commission of a crime in some way and that the crime resulted in
the death of another person. Indeed, even if a principal is found
incapable of committing the crime, this may not defeat the liability
of an aider-abettor. 84 Thus, a defendant, under the aider-abettor
version of the felony murder rule, need not be armed or even present during the commission or attempted commission of a crime.
The defendant, to be found guilty of a felony murder, need not
have counseled another to commit a crime nor need the crime committed be inherently dangerous.
One final striking feature of the felony murder rule is that the
only mens rea that a prosecutor must establish for a finding of
guilt under a felony murder count is that the defendant intended
to commit the underlying crime, usually a specified felony, and in
the course of committing the crime someone died. 85 Thus, the requisite mens rea need not include any homicidal intent or
purpose.8 6
The felony murder rule, then, has become one of vicarious liability for certain conduct. Yet the amorphous nature of the crime of

153 (Mo. 1980); People v. Hichman, 59 I. 2d 89, 319 N.E.2d 511, cert. denied, 421 U.S. 913
(1974); People v. Podolski, 332 Mich. 508, 52 N.W.2d 201 (1952).
84. People v. Hallett, 71 A.D.2d 815, 419 N.Y.S.2d 397 (1979). Cf. People v. Porter, 54
N.Y.S.2d 3 (1945).
85. Warren v. State, 29 Md. App. 560, 350 A.2d 173 (1976). "The intent to perpetuate
the robbery, which element the jury of necessity found in returning its verdict of attempted
robbery, supplied the intent aspect of malice necessary to establish a felony-murder." 350
A.2d at 178. See also Commonwealth v. Bolish, 391 Pa. 550, 138 A.2d 447, reh'g denied, 357
U.S. 931 (1958). "Thus he was actively participating in the felony which resulted in death.
The element of malice, present in the design of defendant, necessarily must be imputed to
the resulting killing, and made him responsible for the death." 391 Pa. at 553, 138 A.2d at
449.
86. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 619 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring).
In People v. Bowen, 12 Mich. App. 438, 162 N.W.2d 911 (1968), the court noted "all that
is necessary is that the defendant undertook the robbery with the intent to commit a felony,
not necessarily to commit murder." Id. at 440, 162 N.W.2d at 912. See also PERKINS, supra
note 69, at 37: "Even without an intent to kill or injure, or an act done in wanton and wilful
disregard of the obvious likelihood of causing such harm, homicide is murder if it falls
within the scope of the felony murder rule."
"[I]t is no defense that those who did not actually participate in the killing did not intend
that life should be taken in the perpetration of the robbery, or had forbidden their associate
to kill, or regretted that it has been done." People v. Cabaltero, 31 Cal. 2d 52, 61, 87 P.2d
364, 369 (1939).
One court even held a defendant guilty of felony murder when he accidentally killed his
co-defendant. State v. Blackman, 587 S.W.2d 292 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
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felony murder is problematic not because many felony murder defendants may not be guilty of the most heinous crimes, but rather
because the prosecutor, in establishing a case in which the death
penalty may be applied, does not have to prove very much.
ENMUND

v. FLORIDA

The extension of the death penalty to one who does not intend
to kill is a harsh doctrine especially when the defendant is not indirectly involved as a perpetrator of the underlying felony. In Enmund v. Florida,s7 the latest felony murder case decided by the
Supreme Court, the Court was presented with the question of
whether a person participating in a crime resulting in death could
be subjected to the death penalty following a conviction based
solely on a theory of vicarious liability.88
Background
On April 1, 1975, an elderly couple was murdered during the
course of a robbery at their home in Florida. Witnesses observed a
man inside a parked car outside the couple's home on the morning
of the murder. The man inside the car was Earl Enmund.89 Enmund and one of his co-defendants were tried together for the felony and the murders. 90 Enmund was convicted of two counts of
first degree murder and one count of robbery.9 1 After returning
Enmund's verdict of guilt on all counts, the jury recommended the
death penalty for Enmund and the co-defendant with whom he
was tried. 2 The sentence of death was imposed upon Enmund by
the trial court. The trial court found no mitigating circumstances
in Enmund's case to outweigh the aggravating factors."
On appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, Enmund argued in
part that the Florida law in existence at the time of the crimes"

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982).
See infra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
399 So. 2d 1362, 1364, 1370 (Fla. 1981).
Id. at 1363. Both were convicted of first-degree murder and robbery.
Id.
Id.
The findings of the trial judge are set out at 399 So. 2d at 1371-73.
(1)(a) The unlawful killing of a human being, when perpetrated from a premeditated design to effect the death of the person killed or any human being, or when
committed by a person engaged in the perpetration of, or in the attempt to perpetrate, any arson, rape, robbery, burglary, kidnapping, aircraft piracy, or the unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb, or which
resulted from the unlawful distribution of heroin by a person over the age of sev-
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made his participation punishable at most as second degree mur-

der, 5 for which the death penalty could not be imposed." The
court found, instead, that the Florida law of second degree murder,
under these facts," applied only if the defendant was not personally present at the scene of the crime:98
[A]n individual who personally kills another during the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate one of the enumerated felonies is
guilty of first degree murder . .. [T]he felon's liability for first
degree murder extends to all of his co-felons who are personally
present. As perpetrators of the underlying felony, they are principals in the homicide. In Florida, as in the majority of jurisdictions, the felony murder rule and the law of principals combine to
make a felon generally responsible for the lethal acts of his cofelon. Only if the felon is an accessory before the fact and not
personally present does liability attach under the second degree
murder provision ....

enteen years when such drug is proven to be the proximate cause of the death of
the user, shall be murder in the first degree and shall constitute a capital felony,
punishable as provided in § 775.082.
(b) In all cases under this section, the procedure set forth in § 921.141 shall be
followed in order to determine sentence of death or life imprisonment.
(2) When perpetrated by any act imminently dangerous to another and evincing
a depraved mind regardless of human life, although without any premeditated design to effect the death of any particular individual, or when committed in perpetration of, or in the attempt to perpetrate, any arson, rape, robbery, burglary, kidnapping, aircraft piracy, or the unlawful throwing, placing or discharging of a
destructive device or bomb, except as provided in subsection (1), it shall be murder in the second degree and shall constitute a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for life or for such term of years as may
be determined by the court.
(3) When perpetrated without any design to effect death, by a person engaged
in the perpetration of, or in the attempt to perpetrate, any felony other than arson, rape, robbery, burglary, kidnapping, aircraft piracy, or the unlawful throwing,
placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb, it shall be murder in the
third degree and shall constitute a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in § 775.082, § 775.083, or § 775.084.
FLA. STAT. § 782.04 (1973).
95. 399 So. 2d at 1368.
96. The penalty for second degree murder is life or "such term of years as may be deter-

mined by the court."
97. The Florida law in existence, see supra note 94, was viewed as having revived the
distinctions between accessories before the fact and principals, although such distinctions
had been abolished by statute. See FLA. STAT. § 777.011 (1973), discussed at 399 So. 2d at
1369.
98. Personal presence thus appears to be the talisman for execution in Florida. Accordingly, a person who hires another to kill would not be executed.
99. 399 So. 2d at 1369 (citations omitted).
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In response, Enmund argued that he was not personally present.10 0 The court responded:
There was no direct evidence at trial that Earl Enmund was present at the back door of the Kersey home when the plan to rob
the elderly couple led to their being murdered. . . . [The] only
evidence of the degree of his participation is the jury's likely inference that he was the person in the car by the side of the road
near the scene of the crimes. The jury could have concluded that
he was there, a few hundred feet away, waiting to help the robbers escape with the Kersey's money.' °
In finding this evidence sufficient, the court relied on a theory of
''constructive presence:"
[T]he presence of the aider and abetter need not have been actual, but it is sufficient if he was constructively present, provided
the aider, pursuant to a previous understanding, is sufficiently
near and so situated as to abet or encourage, or to render assistance to, the actual perpetrator in committing the felonious act or
in escaping after its commission.101
Thus, the evidence was sufficient, according to the Florida Supreme Court, to find that Enmund was a principal in the second
degree.10 3 Such a finding supported a verdict of murder in the first
degree based on the felony murder portion of the Florida murder
statute.0 4 The Florida Supreme Court affirmed both the finding of
guilt and the sentences imposed. 08 In addition, Enmund argued
that because the evidence did not establish that he intended to
take a life the death sentence was impermissible under the eighth
amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment. 00 The Florida
Supreme Court rejected all arguments.0 7
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.' 0 8 In his
brief, Enmund argued among other points, that "in light of [his]
lack of personal responsibility for homicide, his sentence of death
is unconstitutionally excessive and disproportionate under the
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
Florida,

Id. at 1368.
Id. at 1370.
Id. at 1370 (quoting Pope v. State, 84 Fla. 428, 446, 94 So. 865, 871 (1922)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1373.
Id. at 1371.
Id. at 1373.
Enmund v. State, 399 So. 2d 1362 (Fla. 1981), cert. granted sub nom. Enmund v.
454 U.S. 939 (1982).
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Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." 1 9 The State of Florida
argued that "absent a showing of irrationality, state legislatures
have always been accorded great deference in fixing the intent elements of crimes," 0and that rules "on intent should not be
constitutionalized.M1
Supreme Court Oral Argument
At oral argument before the Supreme Court, the Justices' questions focused on Coker v. Georgia"' and Lockett v. Ohio." 2
In Coker, the Court ruled that the death penalty was disproportionate to the crime of rape of an adult woman. Coker found that
the eighth amendment bars not only those punishments that are
"barbaric" but also those that are "excessive" in relation to the
crime committed. A punishment was said to be "excessive" if it:
"(1) makes no measureable contribution to acceptable goals of
punishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and
needless imposition of pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly out of
the crime. A punishment might fail
proportion to the severity of
'
ground.""
either
on
the test
Before the death penalty can be imposed, murder statutes typically require that the defendant be shown to have purposefully
killed the victim. This is the legislative judgment. In felony murder
situations, however, the intent requirement can be vicariously supplied. In Lockett v. Ohio," 4 the jury was charged with the presumption that one who: "purposely aids, helps, associates himself/
herself with another for the purpose of committing a crime is regarded as if he or she were the principal offender and is just as
guilty as if the person performed every act constituting .the offense. .

.

. " " The lower court in Lockett further instructed that

as to intent:
A person engaged in a common design with others to rob by force
and violence an individual or individuals of their property is presumed to acquiesce in whatever may reasonably be necessary to
accomplish the object of their enterprise ....

If the conspired

robbery and the manner of its accomplishment would be reasona109.

50 U.S.L.W. 3739 (3/16/82).

110. Id.
111. 433 U.S. 584 (1977). See discussion in 31 CRim. L. REP. (BNA) 4004 (1982).
112. 438 U.S. 586 (1978). See discussion in 31 Cram. L. REP. (BNA) 4004-05 (1982).
113. 433 U.S. at 592.
114. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
115. Id. at 593.
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bly likely to produce death, each plotter is equally guilty with the
principal offender as an aider and abettor in the homicide ...
An intent to kill by an aider and abettor may be found to exist
beyond a reasonable doubt under such circumstances."'
In Lockett, the defendant, a twenty-one year-old black woman,
upon conviction for aggravated murder was to receive a mandatory
death sentence unless certain statutorily prescribed mitigating circumstances were presented. The Supreme Court reversed the defendant's subsequent death sentence on grounds that mitigating
circumstances could not be limited to those listed in the Ohio
1
statute. 7
Justice Blackmun, writing a separate concurrence in Lockett," 8
found the application of the Ohio aggravated murder statute "particularly harsh" in its coverage of even accidental killings in the
course of a robbery. While doubting that a "bright-line" rule of
disproportionality in sentencing could be drawn, Justice Blackmun
nevertheless stated: "It might be that to inflict the death penalty
in some situations would skirt the limits of the Eighth Amendment
proscription, incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment, against
gross disproportionality, . . ."1 Justice Blackmun concluded,
however, that the states will be sufficiently limited by requiring the
consideration of participation by a non-triggerman in assessing
"punishment for actions less immediately connected to the deliber20
ate taking of human life.'
In his concurrence in the judgment of the Court, Justice Marshall noted that the principle of proportionality was violated in
that the Ohio death penalty statute made no distinction between
"a willful and malicious murderer and an accomplice to an armed
robbery in which a killing unintentionally occurs.' 21
Justice White found that it "violates the Eighth Amendment to
impose the penalty of death without a finding that the defendant
possessed a purpose to cause the death of the victim.' 122 He noted

Id.
117. Id. at 608.
118. Id. at 613.
116.

119.

Id. at 613-i4.

120. Id. at 616.
121. Id. at 620. As stated by Westerfield, aupra note 57, at 166, "The answer to the
problem is to revise the law of accomplice liability so that it reflects realistically the degree
of culpability and wrongdoing of each party to a crime, imposing penalties appropriate to
each of those degrees."
122. 438 U.S. at 624.
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that out of 363 reported executions for homicide since 1954, only
eight clearly involved individuals who did not personally commit
the murder, and that at least some of those did include defendants
"who intended to cause the death of the victim."1 2 Justice White
observed that the rarity of capital punishment for such offenders
invoked the rule in Furman v. Georgia, 2"' that unfettered discretion in the imposition of the death penalty rendered the penalty
cruel and unusual punishment. In the Lockett context, Justice
White concluded, "[t]he value of capital punishment as a deterrent
'12 5
to those lacking a purpose to kill is extremely attenuated.
Supreme Court Decision
On July 2, 1982, the United States Supreme Court reversed Enmund's death sentence as violative of the eighth and fourteenth
amendments."" In a five to four opinion delivered by Justice
White, the Court concluded that the eighth amendment does not
permit
imposition of the death penalty on one such as Enmund who aids
and abets a felony in the course of which a murder is committed
by others but who does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend
that a killing take place or that lethal force will be employed. 1 7
Thus, Enmund represents a clear rejection of the death penalty for
accomplice liability in felony murder cases. The rationale of the
decision, however, goes much deeper and may be viewed as a leap
toward an abridgement between wilful murder and felony murder
in capital cases.
In reaching this decision, the Court first surveys the death penalty statutes of all thirty-six states that permit the death penalty,
the sentencing decision~s of capital juries, and the nation's death
row population before finding a societal rejection of the death penalty for accomplice liability in felony murder. For the first time,
the Court rejects the notion that the death penalty can be imposed
for any involvement in a felony in which someone is killed. Regardless of the state legislative judgment, the Court finds that eighth
amendment limitations require an inquiry into the underlying sub-

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 624-25.
408 U.S. 238 (1972).
438 U.S. at 625.
Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 3368, 3379 (1982).
Id. at 3376-77.
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stantive offense, even for felony murder. In Coker v. Georgia,128 the
death penalty, "unique in its severity and irrevocability," was held
excessive for the crime of rape. 129 That rationale is now extended
to felony murder cases with the Court stating that the death penalty "is an excessive penalty for the robber who, as such, does not
take human life."1 0
The recent decision clearly abolishes vicarious liability for felony
murder. Less clear is the effect of the decision on accidental homicides occurring in the course of a felony where the defendant is the
perpetrator of the accidental death. At one point, the Court states
that "[i]t is fundamental that 'causing harm intentionally must be
punished more severely than causing the same harm unintentionally.' "I" The Court concludes that the death penalty will be an
unconstitutional punishment unless it measurably contributes to
the goal of either retribution or deterrence of capital crimes by
13 2
prospective offenders.

In rejecting the transfer of culpability from robbery to murder
for one who aids and abets a robbery in the course of which a murder is committed, the Court states as to deterrence:
We are quite unconvinced, however, that the threat that the
death penalty will be imposed for murder will measurably deter
one who does not kill and has no intention or purpose that life
will be taken. Instead, it seems likely that "capital punishment
can serve as a deterrent only when murder is the result of premeditation and deliberation," Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S.
463, 484 . . .(1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), for if a person

does not intend that life be taken or contemplate that lethal force
will be employed by others, the possibility that the death penalty
will be imposed for vicarious felony murder will not "enter into
the cold calculus that precedes the decision to act." Gregg v.
Georgia, supra, 428 U.S., at 186 ....

It would be very different if the likelihood of a killing in the
course of a robbery were so substantial that one should share the
blame for the killing if he somehow participated in the felony.
But competent observers have concluded that there is no basis in
experience for the notion that death so frequently occurs in the
course of a felony for which killing is not an essential ingredient
128.
129.
130.

131.
132.

433 U.S. 584 (1977).
See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976).
102 S. Ct. at 3377.
Id. (quoting H. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 162 (1968)).
Id. at 3377.
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that the death penalty should be considered as a justifiable deterrent to the felony itself133 (citation omitted).
With respect to retribution as a justification for the death sentence, the Court states:
American criminal law has long considered a defendant's intention - and therefore his moral guilt - to be critical to "the degree
of [his] criminal culpability," Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684,
698. .. (1975), and the Court has found criminal penalties to be
unconstitutionally excessive in the absence of intentional wrongdoing.. . . For purposes of imposing the death penalty, Enmund's criminal culpability must be limited to his participation
in the robbery, and his punishment must be tailored to his per134
sonal responsibility and moral guilt.
Justice O'Connor, writing for the four dissenters, would also
reverse the death penalty, but would do so on the basis that the
trial judge fundamentally misunderstood the petitioner's role in
the crimes in imposing sentence. Justice O'Connor criticizes the
majority "because today's holding interferes with state criteria for
assessing legal guilt by recasting intent as a matter of federal constitutional law."13 5
CONCLUSION

The various crimes of homicide called murder vary greatly, especially in the distinctions which have developed between wilful murder and felony murder. While wilful murder has been constantly
narrowed in its application, felony murder has been expanded to a
doctrine of vicarious liability for crimes not contemplated at common law."'
A significant constitutional difference has been recognized between the death penalty and lesser punishments, sufficient to justify intrusion into a state's legislative judgment as to the application of the death penalty: 8 7 "It is of vital importance to the
defendant and to the community that any decision to impose the
death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than

133. Id. at 3377-78.
134. Id. at 3378.
135. Id. at 3379 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
136. See supra notes 69-86 and accompanying text.
137. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 102 S. Ct. 869 (1982) (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,
605 (1978)).
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caprice or emotion."''3
Capital punishment for murder has been conceptualized and upheld as a sentencing decision. 3 9 However, with increasing frequency the Supreme Court is having to review the imposition of
the death penalty in light of the defendant's participation in the
homicide. 1" 0 There is a functional necessity, ultimately, that a
state's calculated decision to kill a human being should be restricted as a penalty to a very narrow class of human conduct. If
we look only to sentencing principles, we come of necessity to an
"eugenic" definition as a basis for executing persons who have participated in a non-homicidal crime wherein someone is killed.' 4
"Actus Non Facit Reum Nisi Mens Sit Rea' ' 2 has been the
most sacred principle of criminal jurisprudence for hundreds of
years, reflective of moral belief that the only actions for which a
person is responsible are those for which he has the requisite mens
rea.14 3 Whether or not a state should be allowed to impose the
death penalty engenders great debate. Certainly, then, such penalty should be conservatively imposed only on a class of prisoners
where the state has produced evidence of homicidal mens rea.

138. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637-38 (1980) (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S.
349, 357-58 (opinion of Stevens, J.)). See also cases cited in Gardner.
139. See Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637 (1978); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); Proffit
v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
140. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 102 S. Ct. 869 (1982); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420
(1980); Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637 (1978); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
141. Even the Code of Hammurabi set as a limitation on the harshness of the early law
the limitation of "An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth," which is why the inquiry is
appropriate here, despite Justice Rehnquist's dissenting comment in Lockett that "there is
nothing in the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments contained in the Eighth
Amendment which sets that injunction as a limitation on the maximum sentence which
society may impose." 438 U.S. at 635-36. Legal analysts since Justice Stephens have been
unable to justify the overbroadness of the felony-murder doctrine in capital cases. Although
Justice Rehnquist states that the felony-murder doctrine is supported by "centuries of common law doctrine," it is quite clear as Professor Fletcher states "There is no authority
whatever for the principle that any felonious intent is sufficient to constitute malice aforethought." G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 282 (1978).
142. "An act does not make [the doer of it] guilty, unless the mind be guilty; that is

unless the intention be criminal."

BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY

34 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).

143. "Guilty mind." See Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARv.L. REv. 974 (1931-32). "The conception of blameworthiness or moral guilt is necessarily based upon a free mind voluntarily
choosing evil rather than good; there can be no criminality in the sense of moral shortcoming if there is no freedom of choice or normality of will capable of exercising a free choice."
Id. at 1004.
Conscience is defined as the "sense or consciousness of the moral goodness or blameworthiness of one's own conduct, intentions, or character together with a feeling of obligation to
do right or be good." WnSTER's Now COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 238 (1981).
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In Enmund, the Supreme Court began to bridge the sharp division between wilful murder and felony murder in capital cases.
Conceptualizing capital punishment as a sentencing decision rather
than a decision to be imposed only on limited crimes of homicide
has caused the present dilemma. Only those murders in which
there is evidence of the most serious moral culpability directly related to the homicide should be allowed to be punished by death.
The unacceptable substitution of legislative presumptions in lieu
of proof in felony murder capital cases offends principles of proportionality, and denigrates the respect and confidence of the community in the fair and just utilization of governmental power.
The death penalty should require individual culpability, and in
order for society to purposefully kill another human being, the
least that should be required is that there be evidence that that
human being have had a purpose to kill his or her victim.
This will pose an additional burden of proof on the prosecution,
one indeed difficult at times to elucidate. That difficulty has not,
however, caused the Court to hesitate when dealing with questions
of the mitigation of murder to manslaughter."'

144. Cf. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684
(1974); Warren v. State, 29 Md. App. 560, 350 A.2d 173 (1976).

